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It is a privilege and a pleasure to welcome all of you to Georgia Tech and to Technology Square. 
We are honored to host this Southern Regional Meeting of the National Academies’ Committee 
on a New Government-University Partnership for Science and Security, together with Emory 
University and the Southeast Regional Center of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging 
Infections. 
 
It is not a new or unique experience for Georgia Tech and Emory to collaborate; we do it every 
day. Georgia Tech has one of the nation’s most highly rated engineering programs, and Emory 
has an outstanding medical school. So we pooled our assets and became partners in a biomedical 
engineering program that to our knowledge is the only joint academic program between a public 
and a private university in the nation. It is one of the nation’s leading biomedical engineering 
programs, and includes two national centers of excellence – in the engineering of living tissues 
and in nano-medicine, especially as it relates to the diagnosis and treatment of cancer. 
 
The Southeast Regional Center of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging Infections is the new 
kid on the block. It was formed in 2003 by a group of research universities at the initiative of 
Duke University, and focuses on translational research designed to provide vaccines, medicines, 
and diagnostic tests for emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases that could be potential 
tools in hands of bioterrorists. And we are pleased to have the center join us as a co-host for this 
meeting. 
 
Three years ago in 2003, I celebrated the 200th anniversary of the historic cross-country journey 
of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark by taking a boat trip up the Columbia and Snake Rivers, 
retracing part of their trip. And as we went, I read their journal. That trip helped me understand 
the rich heritage this nation has of exploration, discovery, and risk taking. Beginning with the 
earliest pioneers, Americans have always looked for new frontiers and imagined a better future. 
 
Today, instead of the geographic frontiers Lewis and Clark explored, our new frontiers lie in the 
realm of science and ideas. But the process of exploration, risk taking, and discovery is just as 
essential to our future as a nation in the 21st century as it was when Thomas Jefferson sent Lewis 
and Clark on their journey in 1803. 
 
I have the privilege of serving on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology. And the same year I took that boat trip commemorating the 200th anniversary of the 
Lewis and Clark expedition, I also served on a PCAST panel that looked at the Science and 
Technology of Combating Terrorism. That panel was a reminder that many of the fundamental 
characteristics that drive exploration and discovery have the potential to be at odds with 
homeland security. Even as our future prosperity depends increasingly on scientific exploration 
and discovery, we are facing the need to re-balance freedom and risk-taking on the one hand 
against national security on the other. 
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Fundamental research, which in the United States is conducted primarily at universities, thrives 
in an environment of openness and collaboration. National Security Decision Directive 189 from 
back in the 1980s recognized that, saying, “No restriction may be placed on the conduct or 
reporting of federally funded fundamental research that has not received national security 
classification.” 
 
However, after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began to tighten 
restrictions on federally funded research, and the number of complaints from universities began 
to grow. Which brings me to a third thing that happened in 2003 – the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science conducted a study on these new restrictive clauses. 
 
What they found was that in some cases universities decided to forego federal money altogether 
rather than accept restrictions. MIT, for example, turned down more than $400,000 in federal 
funding for their Artificial Intelligence Lab because it would have required the federal 
government to approve all employees. However, in most cases, universities have responded by 
engaging in a negotiation process to modify the language to be more acceptable. And in most 
cases, these negotiations have delayed the start of the research projects. 
 
The AAAS wasn’t the only organization raising a red flag. AAU and COGR also weighed in, 
stressing that university research is based on a free exchange of knowledge, and unless it was 
classified, fundamental research conducted by universities should remain unrestricted. 
 
The federal government spends $25 billion a year on university research. These funds are 
distributed by a wide range of agencies and departments, including NASA, the NIH, NSF, NRC, 
DARPA, NIST, and the Departments of Energy and Agriculture – to name a few.  Some of these 
agencies and programs have been taking the initiative – or have felt they are required – to add 
new restrictions to their research contracts. These restrictions might include a designation that 
the research is sensitive but unclassified, or that foreign nationals are restricted from 
participating. The Department of Homeland Security, responding to security concerns for its 
research activities, has also joined the fray with restrictions specific to its research. 
 
There are too many cooks stirring this stew, and what it boils down to is that there is no 
consistent policy. What the Department of Energy finds acceptable today, the Department of 
Homeland Security may find objectionable tomorrow. What NSF considers legitimate may be 
unacceptable to NASA. Rather than having a reasonable, workable policy that is consistent 
across the board, research universities are put in the difficult and cumbersome position of  
enforcing different sets of restrictions and constraints for different research contracts. And 
research universities were gratified to read in last Wednesday’s Federal Register that the 
Department of Commerce has acknowledged the concerns raised in more than 300 comment 
letters from people like me and modified its proposals for additional restrictions regarding 
deemed exports. 
 
At the Georgia Tech Research Corporation, we basically have two tracks for administering 
research contracts – classified and unclassified.  And while we have tried to work out difficulties 
with restrictive clauses, it is creating problems. Constraints that must be imposed on unclassified 
projects that have unusual restrictions attached to them, mirror many of the restrictions that must 
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be imposed in managing classified research. In addition, when a funding agency imposes a 
restriction on the use of foreign nationals in the research, we are forced to exclude students from 
those projects, which is detrimental both to the student and to the Institute. 
 
I have heard representatives of the federal government articulate their conviction that nations 
who do not wish us well are placing graduate students and faculty at our universities in order to 
take advantage of the opportunity to work on sensitive research to the benefit of their home 
countries. And I do not doubt that there is truth in that statement. But at the same time, we also 
need to face the reality that if the United States adopts a bunker mind-set and cuts itself off from 
the international community of academic research and researchers, we will be the losers. 
 
Back in the days when the threat of the Cold War was looming ominously over us, we essentially 
had this same discussion, and we realized the folly of isolating ourselves at that time. This time 
around, the penalties for cutting ourselves off will be even harsher. What happened with 
satellites during the 1990s is illustrative. The United States used to have the world market 
cornered on launching satellites, but as other nations developed their own technological 
capabilities, the world simply by-passed us and did it themselves when we made it too difficult 
and cumbersome for them to work with us. 
 
Part of the reason the United States emerged as the world’s undisputed leader in science and 
technology during the 20th century was that, through no effort or intents of our own, we became a 
magnet for the world’s best talent. One of the unintended consequences of the political events of 
the day was that a disproportionate number of the world’s brightest minds were looking to 
escape Nazism in Germany, or the rising tide of communism in the Soviet Union, or the lack of 
opportunity caused by poverty, war, and political instability in other parts of the world. And they 
came to the United States of their own volition. 
 
Today both Nazism and the Cold War are gone, and nations like India, China, and Russia are 
upgrading their universities and increasing economic opportunity at home. At the same time, the 
United States has made it more difficult for bright students and academics to obtain visas. Those 
who still manage to come here are handicapped by deemed export policies. If they no longer feel 
welcome here, where will they go? Who will have the benefits of their talents if not the United 
States? 
 
America has a rich heritage of entrepreneurism that propelled us to the forefront as the most 
prosperous and powerful nation in the world, but it is growing clear that the rules have changed.  
Tom Friedman’s book, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, describes 
the leveling of the global economic playing field, which is threatening the economic leadership 
the United States has enjoyed since World War II. A vast web of information technologies now 
interconnects the world, and anyone with a computer and Internet access can be an instant player 
in the global economy. Rising technological competency in nations from Ireland and Finland to 
China and India means that skilled workers from anywhere in the world are only a mouse click 
away. 
 
We are standing on the brink of a new industrial order with clear potential for the 21st century to 
be the age of Asia’s economic ascendancy. Population demographics indicate that 20 years from 
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now, 56 percent of the world’s population will live in Asia, compared to just 4 percent in the 
United States. As Friedman points out, even if only 10 percent of Chinese, Russians, and Indians 
become engaged in the global market, that is still more than the entire population of the United 
States. Already the number of cell phone users in China is greater than the entire population of 
the United States. 
 
Nations like China and India are also deliberately investing in building world-class universities. 
Thirty years ago, the United States was conferring 54 percent of the world’s Ph.D. degrees. The 
brightest and best students from around the world were attracted to our shores for graduate study, 
and many of them stayed because career opportunities here were better than at home. However, 
by 2001, our share of the Ph.D.s awarded worldwide had dropped to 41 percent, and China, 
which conferred virtually no Ph.D. degrees at all as recent as 20 years ago, now produces 12 
percent of the world’s Ph.D.s. Doctoral graduates in nations like India and China also have a 
growing range of opportunities for employment at home.  
 
What’s more, in China 40 percent of college students are majoring in engineering, compared to 
just 6 percent in the United States. Last year, 325,000 Chinese earned engineering degrees 
compared to fewer than 60,000 Americans. India and the European Union have also surpassed 
the United States in graduating engineers.  
 
The global economy is moving at warp speed, and the development of new products is no longer 
a linear process, but involves interaction between R&D operations, manufacturing operations, 
and consumers. In an economy that is driven by innovation, the winners are those who are first to 
get new ideas to the market. And the companies with the competitive edge are increasingly the 
ones that can locate their research and manufacturing facilities close to each other, close to major 
research universities, and close to their growth markets all at the same time. As nations like 
China and India develop world-class universities and skilled workforces, high-tech corporations 
are moving their research and development facilities there. Microsoft’s biggest R&D facility is 
not in Seattle, but in Beijing, China. GE’s Jack Welch Research Centre in Bangalore, India, 
employs 2,500 scientists, and GE is building a $250 million medical facility in New Delhi.  
 
In this new, highly competitive, global game, it would be unrealistic for the United States to 
think that we will continue to dominate the high-tech end of the economy as we have in the past. 
We will no longer have the world’s largest technology market and technological workforce. Our 
wages and health care costs are higher than those of our global competitors. And we can expect 
to produce only one of every four or five major inventions. It will be difficult enough to compete 
in this environment without handicapping and isolating ourselves with any more restrictions than 
are absolutely essential. 
 
Last January, I was privileged to attend the U.S. University Presidents Summit on International 
Education, convened by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Education 
Margaret Spellings. From the perspective of the two secretaries and President Bush, the focus of 
that summit was on student exchanges and the need for Americans to learn more foreign 
languages as a contribution to our nation’s security. But for the university presidents who came 
to Washington for the summit, the foremost issues in our minds revolved around deemed exports 
and visas for international students. 
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We presidents who were there were pretty unanimous in what we want. We understand the 
importance of national security, and we want the federal government to build high walls around 
small places – to define clearly those specific matters that are absolutely essential to national 
security and protect them vigorously – but then to allow openness in all other areas. 
 
For example, to define “nanotechnology” as a matter of national security is being far too broad 
and puts American competitiveness at risk. The U.S. government is spending a billion dollars a 
year for nanotechnology research, but so is the European Union. So is China. So is Japan. If the 
burden of compliance gets too high, the research will go to these other places. If the constraints 
on the best graduate students and faculty become too onerous, they will go to these other places. 
And the United States will be left behind as other nations overtake and pass us on their way to 
world scientific and technological leadership. 
 
We clearly need to take a comprehensive look at the type and level of restriction that is truly 
essential for national security, and then forge a new agreement between universities and 
government on the balance point between openness on the one hand and security on the other as 
they relate to university research. So I want to thank the National Academies for taking the 
initiative to create the Committee on a New Government-University Partnership for Science and 
Security. 
 
This is the second of three regional meetings to discuss the issues surrounding restrictive clauses 
in federal grants, the dissemination of scientific information, the handling of sensitive but 
unclassified information, and the management of biological agents in university research.  The 
first was a few weeks ago at MIT, and the third will be later in the summer in California. And I 
join the National Academies in believing that these regional meetings are an important step in 
beginning the essential process of forging a new partnership between government and the 
nation’s research universities that will serve our need for both science and security in the 
innovation-driven global economy of the 21st century. 
